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In this paper we experimentally test whether competing for a desired reward does not only affect 
individuals’ performance, but also their tendency to cheat. Recent doping scandals in sports as well 
as  forgery  and  plagiarism  scandals  in  academia  have  been  partially  explained  by  „competitive 
pressures“, which suggests a link between competition and cheating.  
  In our experiment subjects conduct a task where they have the possibility to make use of 
illegitimate tools to better their results. We find that women react much stronger to competitive 
pressure by increasing their cheating activity while there is no overall sex difference in cheating. 
However, the effect of competition on women’s cheating behavior is entirely due to the fact that 
women, on average, are doing worse with respect to the assigned task. Indeed we find that it is the 
ability of an individual to conduct a particular task and not sex that crucially affects the reaction to 
competition.  Poor  performers  significantly  increase  their  cheating  behavior  under  competition 
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Economic  theory  typically  considers  competition  as  desirable,  since  competition  improves  the 
functioning of markets, fosters innovation, guarantees efficiency by forcing firms to produce at 
lowest costs, encourages highest effort among employees and reduces possibilities of discriminatory 
behaviour of employers (Becker, 1957; for a recent experimental study see e.g. Cabrales et al., 
2006).  Lately,  however,  economists  began  to  become  interested  in  other  than  purely  economic 
effects of competition. For example, Shleifer (2004) suggests that competition may favor unethical 
behavior such as corruption or cheating; Brandts et al. (2006) show that competition has a strong 
negative impact on the distribution of emotional states of people, their experienced well-being and 
disposition towards others. Gneezy et al. (2003) found that competition may partly be responsible 
for  women’s  relatively  weak  labor  market  position  as  women  do  not  increase  their  effort  as 
systematically as men in a competitive setting.
1 
In this paper we are interested in the effect of competitive pressure on cheating. Any form of 
breaking  the  rules  is  generally  understood  to  be  cheating.  Cheating  can  be  considered  to  be  a 
criminal action - to avoid punishment, it is done secretly with the hope not to be caught. According 
to the economics of crime, as originated by Becker (1968), crime can be viewed as a rational act 
that is chosen by an individual depending on the benefits and costs involved. Previous economic 
research has particularly investigated cheating in the classroom and confirmed that people with low 
grade  point  average  (GPA),  who  have  more  to  gain,  cheat  more  than  students  with  high  GPA 
(Kerkvliet  and  Sigmund,  1999;  Bunn  et  al.,  1992).  Furthermore,  it  has  been  demonstrated  that 
cheating behaviour can be reduced by increasing the costs of being caught (Kerkvliet and Sigmund, 
1999). Nagin et al. (2002) again have investigated cheating behavior in a firm and found that while 
reductions in monitoring (that reduce the likelihood of being caught) have increased shirking in a 
significant  portion  of  the  employees,  other  workers  do  not  respond  according  to  the  “rational 
cheater model”. Another economic realm in which “cheating” has been investigated is tax evasion. 
As  Franzoni  (2000)  points  out  the  empirical  research  in  this  area  is  inconclusive  but  expected 
punishment appears to negatively affect cheating. 
                                                 
1 Indeed there exists a substantial body of research that investigates the effect of sex and competition in the meantime. 
One particular focus in this literature has been the effect of the sex composition of a group on the performance of an 
individual of a particular sex which has lead to ambiguous results (Gneezy et al., 2003; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004; 
Antonovics et al., 2003; Price, 2008). Further studies have also examined whether there is a sex difference with respect 
to the choice to enter a competition (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Vandegrift et al., 2004) and whether individuals 
choose to engage in competition depending on the sex of the other participant Datta Gupta et al. (2005).    3 
With respect to competition the “rational cheater model” would predict that the higher the 
competition, i.e. the higher the benefit of doing better than the others, the more cheating we should 
observe. And indeed, various cases of plagiarism as well as forged research results in academia
2 and 
doping scandals in sports
3 have been revealed recently which point towards the existence of heavy 
cheating in these areas. As Frank and Cook (1995) argue in these fields we find increasingly that 
people  at  the  top  are  disproportionally  rewarded,  which  heightens  competition  and  generates  a 
“winner-take-all society” where many people compete for positions without a realistic chance of 
obtaining them. The incentive to cheat, or to “play dirty” is actually built into such a competitive 
reward structure according to Kohn (1992). 
But  also  behavioural/psychological  motives  may  lead  towards  increased  cheating  under 
competitive  pressure.  Competition  emphasises  the  importance  of  personal  success.  As  a  result, 
people who do not bring about the desired achievements may feel pressured to engage in pretence 
of such. Furthermore, competition draws the attention from the wellbeing of the group towards the 
individual and thereby lessens the social cohesion within a group. Consequently, individuals may 
find themselves less bound to adhere to standards of fairness but may find it legitimate to gain their 
personal share by cheating.
4 This may be reflected in cases of fraud that have been increasingly 
reported.  Like  encouraging  fraud,  competition  may  also  provide  an  incentive  to  strategically 
misrepresent  information  to  others.  For  example  Hollingshead  et  al.  (2005)  have  found  that 
individuals with competitive incentives who engage in a cooperative task often strategically share 
distorted  information  to  promote  their  preferred  task  solution  and  have  considerable  impact  on 
group decisions. 
In  our  experiment,  individuals  also  have  the  possibility  to  distort  information  among  a 
number of cheating opportunities. Subjects have to conduct a task under two different treatments: a 
non-competitive and competitive treatment. The level of competitiveness is induced by the structure 
                                                 
2 Enders and Hoover (2004) find from their survey that 29 percent of economic journal editors report the receipt of one 
or more plagiarised papers per year on average. For example, Kyklos (1999), The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
(1984) and Research Policy (2007) had to retract published articles that were identified as cases of plagiarism. List et al. 
(2001) examine unethical behaviour in economics more broadly and find that 4 % of economists admit to have at least 
one time falsified their data and 7 – 10 % admit to have engaged in other academic misconduct. They also find that 
economists at high rank institutions appear to engage in unethical behaviour less frequently. Referring to journals such 
as Nature, Science and The Chronicle of Higher Education, Research Policy (2007) argues that there is an increasing 
number of academic misconduct particularly in biomedical research but also in the social sciences. The American 
Association for the Advancement of Science has argued already in 1985 that the strong competition in modern science 
is provoking outright fraud as well as „white lies“ and deceptions that erode the integrity of science (Kohn, 1992). 
3 For an overview over cheating in sport contests see Preston and Szymanski (2003). 
4 A related branch of literature looks at sabotage in tournaments which represent situations of heightened competition 
(for experimental investigation see e.g. Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2003, 2008; Harbring et al., 2004; Carpenter et al., 
2007). While both phenomena, illegitimately harming others (“sabotage”) and enhancing oneself (“cheating”), may be 
two sides of the same coin, we believe that in the real world individuals have more opportunities (and less moral 
concerns) to make themselves look better than sabotaging others.   4 
of the payments awarded which either depend on absolute or relative  performance. As we can 
observe  the  subjects’  behaviour  without  their  knowing  we  can  test  whether  cheating  is  indeed 
increased by competition.  
In  our  experiment  we  find  that  indeed  competitive  pressure  causes  individuals  to  cheat, 
however, this is only the case for individuals, who have a relatively low ability at the task at hand. 
This corresponds with the predictions of the economics of crime that people who have more to gain 





Our experiment was based on the design developed by Gneezy et al. (2003) who measured gender 
differences in reactions towards competition. The online maze-game applied by them is ideally 
suited to test cheating, as it provides various functions that allow players with little supervision to 
systematically  better  their  results.
5  Furthermore,  as  the  game  does  not  automatically  count  the 
number of mazes solved, experimenters have to rely on subjects’ respective records. While Gneezy 
et al. confirmed that players correctly executed their task, in our experiment we abstained from a 
close  supervision  of  subjects  to  investigate  the  cheating  behavior  of  individuals.  To  collect 
information on the correct number of actual mazes solved by the subjects and compare it to the 
number of mazes indicated by them, we applied a spy-ware program
6. Any cheating was identified 
only after the experiment, so cheaters remained anonymous to the authors.  
The participants in our experiment were first asked to solve one or two mazes of difficulty 
level 2 to get familiar with the task. They were instructed to keep the same level of difficulty 
throughout the entire experiment. If they had questions they could ask the experimenter quietly. 
One maze game already appeared on the screen in front of them upon entrance in the laboratory 
(see Figure 1 for a screen shot). The subjects were told to solely use the arrows on the keyboard to 
track a marker through a maze. They were instructed that each maze was only considered solved 
when the marker was led through the goal and a pop-up window appeared that said “Yahoo! You 
have successfully solved the puzzle.” To open a new maze the participants were told to use the 
mouse, click “OK” and “New maze.” After the participants were sufficiently comfortable with the 
task the second part of the instructions was distributed that asked them to execute the task for 30 
                                                 
5 The game can be found at http://games.yahoo.com/games/maze.html.  
6 This may seem deceptive at first, but it is standard that in laboratory experiments subjects’ entire behaviour is 
recorded without explicit mentioning.    5 
minutes.
7 This part of the instructions also specified a particular payment scheme that induced high 
or low competitive pressure. The subjects were explicitly told not to use any other functions than 
the ones described and to carefully record each solved maze into a table, together with the exact 
time of finishing, as these records provided the basis for their payments. While Gneezy et al. (2003) 
confirmed that the subjects marked their table correctly, in our experiment we abstained from such a 
procedure to give individuals the opportunity to cheat. The individuals were given a relatively long 
work  period  of  30  minutes
8  to  give  them  sufficient  time  to  discover  the  different  cheating 
possibilities, but also to increase the spread of actually solved mazes between individuals. As a 
result  a  whole  range  of  numbers  of  mazes  would  appear  plausible  to  the  experimenter  and 
individuals may be more confident to report results that deviate from their actual achievement. 
After  solving  mazes  participants  were  requested  to  fill  out  a  short  questionnaire  that  asked 
demographic characteristics as well as whether individuals enjoyed the particular game played and 
whether they like games in general.  
At the end of the experiment the experimenter counted the number of mazes indicated by 
each participant in the distributed tables as solved and payment was done in accordance with the 
rules for each treatment, privately and in cash.  
 
Cheating 
As has been indicated, the maze-game applied allowed participants to cheat in numerous ways. First 
of  all,  the  online  game  provides  two  functions  that  allow  players  to  simplify  or  speed  up  the 
solution of the maze. The function ‘Auto-Solve’ simply solves the game automatically – not only 
without any effort of the player but also in the fastest possible way. The function ‘Path Verify’ still 
demands that the player navigates the curser through the maze, however it immediately indicates 
when a wrong path is chosen (the curser instantly transforms to a red cross when a wrong path is 
taken instead of drawing a line through the maze). As a result, players can reduce their effort as 
foresight becomes less crucial for a quick and successful solving of the task. Furthermore, mazes 
are available in 5 different levels of difficulty. While participants were asked to work with difficulty 
level  2,  they  could  illegitimately  simplify  their  task  by  switching  to  the  easier  level  1.  Most 
importantly,  however,  individuals  could  cheat  by  indicating  in  their  table  to  have  solved  more 
mazes than they really had.  
  During the course of the experiment each computer was monitored by a spy-program to 
observe the actual behavior of our participants. The program took a screen shot at every mouse-
                                                 
7 The translated instructions are available in the Appendix. 
8 In Gneezy et al. (2003) participants had to solve mazes for only 15 minutes.   6 
click and therefore allowed us to identify all different types of cheating. It did not only record if 
people made use of the functions ‘Auto-Solve’ or ‘Path Verify,’ or when individuals changed the 
level of difficulty of the maze, it also allowed us to identify the number of actually solved mazes 
and compare it to the number indicated by the participants in their respective records.
9 The log files 




Competitive and noncompetitive treatment 
To  investigate  whether  cheating  is  affected  by  the  competitiveness  of  an  environment,  we 
administered two treatments: a competitive treatment, where individuals have to compete against 
each  other  for  payment,  and  a  noncompetitive  treatment,  where  payment  only  depends  on  the 
individual’s own performance.  Following Gneezy  et al. (2003) in the  noncompetitive treatment 
participants received a piece-rate payment where they were paid according to the number of mazes 
solved  –  irrespective  of  the  amount  of  solved  mazes  of  other  participants.  In  our  experiment 
subjects received 30 cents per solved maze in addition to their show up fee of 3 €.  
In the competitive treatment, following Gneezy et al. (2003), individuals were subjected to a 
tournament.  They  were  divided  into  groups  of  six individuals,  where  only  the  person  with  the 
highest  number  of  mazes  got  paid.  In  this  ‘the  winner  takes  all’  treatment  subjects  remained 
ignorant about who their immediate competitors were as several groups simultaneously worked in 
the laboratory. In this condition the winner earned 1,8 € for each maze, which is six times (number 
of participants in the group) the piece rate of 30 cents, plus a 3 € show up fee. All other participants 
only received the show up fee. 
 
Subjects 
                                                 
9 Since the maze-game is provided by a well known major commercial website and not part of a self-written program as 
usually used in laboratory experiments, it is obvious for players that we can not directly access their results from one 
central computer. Indeed to identify the number of mazes individuals have solved we had to download the spyware log-
files from every computer and carefully code them. This is a very time consuming process that can only be done after 
the experiment. It would not be possible to have subjects wait for a payment based on these results.  
While we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that some individuals suspected that our goal was to examine cheating 
behaviour, we actually believe that the advantage of our experiment is that cheating arises naturally in our examined 
environment. This is in stark contrast to e.g. experiments on tax evasion where individuals are explicitly asked whether 
they would cheat under certain conditions. Because we do not offer the explicit choice to cheat the possibility of an 
experimenter demand effect is much lower in our setting. 
10 As has been pointed out before, we do not believe that this manipulation constitutes deception, as we did not claim 
that we could not track individuals’ behaviour on the computer. Typically in experiments the computer records 
everything participants do without explicit mentioning this in the instructions. Furthermore, the subjects were strictly 
paid according to the number of mazes indicated, as stated in the instructions. Finally, cheaters remained strictly 
anonymous to the experimenter and authors.   7 
All participants were students of different majors from the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, 
where the experiment was conducted. In each session an equal number of male and female subjects 
participated. Subjects were never explicitly pointed to the sex-distribution in the lab, but they could 
see that the group composition was always half male and half female when entering the laboratory. 
In total we have fully recorded the laboratory behavior of 33 men and 32 women
11, 32 of which in 




The descriptive results of our experiment can be found in Table 1. The table illustrates the amount 
of mazes individuals solved, the number of mazes they indicated as well as individuals’ cheating 
behavior. Contrary to Gneezy et al. (2003) we do not observe an increase of actually solved mazes 
as a result of increased competition once we allow subjects to cheat (t = 0.427, p = 0.671, two-
tailed).
12  It  appears  that  if  individuals  realize  that  there  is  a  possibility  to  cheat,  incentives  to 
increase efforts in a competitive treatment are muted. Furthermore, in our subject pool, women find 
it significantly harder to solve mazes than men – women solve on average 22.19, men 29 mazes 
over both treatments (t = -3.624, p = 0.001, two tailed). This result corresponds with previous 
findings,  even  though  the  difference  in  performance  between  the  sexes  does  not  always  reach 
significance (Datta Gupta et al., 2005; Gneezy et al., 2003; Arslan et al., 2008). Figure 2 illustrates 
the distribution of solved mazes for men and women and shows that all the top players in our 
sample are male.  
  Table 1 also shows that for the full population the number of mazes indicated by subjects 
increase in the competitive treatment just like most of our cheating variables. Our variable “any 
form of cheating” was coded as 1 when an individual made use of any cheating possibilities and 0 
otherwise.  With  respect  to  the  difference  in  mazes  solved  and  mazes  indicated  as  solved,  we 
considered as cheating only if a subject indicated a number of mazes solved that was more than 1 
above the actually solved amount as reconstructed through our analysis of the spy-ware log-files. 
The reason for this is that a participant could make a mistake once (for example, one could forget to 
press “OK” for the last maze solved) and we want to make sure to include only conscious acts of 
cheating.
13  
                                                 
11 Due to an activation problem of the spy program in our first laboratory session we suffered a singular loss of data that 
is responsible for the unequal amount of female and male subjects fully observed. 
12 This is the case even though the variable “solved mazes” includes those mazes that have been solved using 
illegitimate measures like “Auto-Solve”, “Path-Verify” or where the level of difficulty has been adapted.  
13 Indeed one subject has made such a mistake also to the own disadvantage.   8 
  Comparing  the  overall  frequency  of  cheating  between  the  non-competitive  (37.5%)  and 
competitive  treatment  (42.4%),  a  Chi-Square  test  does  not  indicate  a  significant  difference  in 
overall frequency of cheating between the two treatments for the entire sample of people (Pearson 
Chi-Square = 0.164, p = 0.685 (all tests two-tailed)
14). However, once we split up for the different 
sexes, women appear to increase their cheating behavior under competition (in our sample from 
29.4% to 60%) on a marginally significant level (Pearson Chi-Square = 3.0297, p = 0.082) while 
men do not significantly change their behavior
15 (Pearson Chi-Square = 1.2615, p = 0.262). 
Another possibility to measure “cheating” is to look at how much individuals exaggerate the 
number of mazes they have solved. The variable “difference mazes” counts the difference between 
the number of mazes an individual has indicated as solved and the number actually solved. As 
Table 1 shows, this difference increases from 1.31 in the non-competitive to 2.91 in the competitive 
treatment. The effect of competition is marginally significant (t = - 1.502, p = .070; one-tailed; t-test 
for unequal variances; for men alone: t = - .666, p = .255; for women alone: t = - 1.438, p = .081, 
both one-tailed).  
Finally, Table 1 also indicates which particular cheating possibilities individuals make use 
of. It shows that most people who cheat mainly choose to lie about their actual results (31% in the 
non-competitive and 39% in the competitive treatment exaggerate their results by more than one), 
while fewer make use of the devices “Auto-Solve” (6 subjects) and “Path Verify” (6 subjects). 
Almost nobody (one subject) changes the difficulty level of the task, which indeed is a relatively 
inefficient  way  to  better  one’s  results.
16  The  reason  why  relatively  few  subjects  use  the  latter 
functions probably is that their use could be detected quite easily by an experimenter if she checked 
individuals’ work on the monitors, while adding an additional maze in the list is done quickly and 
hard to observe during the experiment. Furthermore adding a maze could quite plausibly be argued 
to have been “a mistake” when detected, while one could not make a similar excuse for turning on 
one of the particular cheating functions which has to be done intentionally. 
 
                                                 
14 Although we have a clear hypothesis we conduct a two-tailed test because we observe some reduction in male 
cheating behaviour under competition that we do not want to systematically rule out. 
15 The descriptive statistics show some reduction in the male propensity to cheat in the competitive treatment, even if 
not statistically significant. If we consider as cheating also when an individual indicates only one maze more than 
actually solved, than the sample mean for the frequency of cheating remains virtually constant for men in the two 
treatments, while women’s frequency to cheat still increases under competition. 
16 With respect to the cheating behaviour of individuals over time, most players threw in one or more illegitimate mazes 
on and off while correctly solving the task for the rest of the time. Only one individual had one of the functions (path-
verify) activated during the whole time period. Half of the players have cheated for the first time during their first five 
mazes and more than a third has simply added one additional maze at the end – the latter cases, however, may not 
represent conscious acts of cheating if finishing of a maze is unobservable for us because individuals simply forgot to 
click “OK” after their last maze. As stated before, we therefore do not count these latter cases as cheating for our 
analysis.   9 
Sex Differences 
Since  it  is  striking  that  competition  induces  women  to  cheat  more  while  we  do  not  observe  a 
significant effect for men, we also test for sex differences in the previously examined measures for 
cheating. Looking at the overall frequencies of men and women engaging in “any form of cheating” 
we do not find any sex-difference (Pearson Chi-Square = 0.3693, p = 0.543, two-tailed). However, 
if we examine each treatment separately (for the respective frequencies see Table 1), we find a 
marginally  significant  sex  difference  in  cheating  for  the  competitive  treatment  (Competitive 
treatment: Pearson Chi-Square = 3.478, p = 0.062; non-competitive treatment: Pearson Chi-Square 
= 1.012, p = 0.314, both two-tailed).
17 
When we compare how much individuals exaggerate the number of mazes they have solved, 
we obtain no significant effect for sex in any of the treatments (competitive: t = .860, p = .396, 
noncompetitive: t = .086, p = .932, two-tailed). 
 
The probability to cheat in more detail 
Table 2 presents a more detailed analysis of how the probability that a person cheats in any way is 
affected. The coefficients represent marginal effects. In the first specification we merely control for 
treatment,  sex  and  the  interaction  between  the  two.  In  the  following  specifications  we  further 
include the main subject studied by participants in the experiment (base category: economics), as 
well as additional information collected in our survey. While in column 1 the effect of competition 
just  falls  short  of  reaching  significance,  specifications  in  column  2  and  3  indicate  that  the 
probability of cheating is increased by 41 – 48 percentage points in the competitive treatment. This, 
however, is only true for women, as for men this effect is offset by a negative interaction effect of 
similar size (39 – 42 percentage points). Men, therefore, do not appear to significantly change their 
cheating behaviour under competitive pressure. This confirms our previous results. Furthermore, 
individuals who enjoyed playing mazes in the experiment were significantly more likely to cheat – 




Cheating and ability 
In the next step we are interested in whether the ability to conduct a certain task affects the cheating 
behaviour of individuals. Subjects who know that they cannot perform very well in comparison to 
                                                 
17 We conduct a two-tailed test since we do not have a hypothesis about the direction of a sex difference with respect to 
cheating.  
18 If we apply the same specifications to examine how individuals exaggerate the number of mazes they have solved in a 
Tobit analysis (not shown), we also find a positive effect of competiton that is significant at the 10% level.   10 
the people they are competing against may find it necessary to make use of illegitimate tactics to 
retain some chances to succeed. They may also engage in cheating as a ‘face saving strategy’ – 
simply to avoid embarrassment.
19 Studies that investigate cheating in the classroom have suggested 
that particularly poor performers engage in cheating activity (Kerkvliet and Sigmund, 1999; Bunn et 
al., 1992). This is in correspondence with the economics of crime, because poor performers have 
more to gain from cheating. In their study on unethical behaviour in economics, also List et al. 
(2001)  find  that  economists  at  lower  rank  institutions  appear  to  engage  in  unethical  academic 
behaviour more frequently and argue that this may be the case because these researchers have fewer 
resources with which to conduct valid, honest research so they turn to the next best alternative.  
Since women on average performed worse in the task than men (the correlation between 
male sex and the number of mazes solved is 0.42), this may explain the observed sex difference in 
cheating  in  reaction  to  competition.  This  sex  difference  is  all  the  more  surprising  given  that 
previous research has suggested that women are, if anything, less prone to find acts of cheating 
justifiable (Torgler and Valev, 2006). To examine the question whether ability is the driving force 
that  induces  heightened  levels  of  cheating,  we  classified  our  subjects  as  either  ‘good’  or  ‘bad 
players’, depending on whether they managed to solve more or less than the median amount of 
mazes (27 mazes)
20. Table 3 illustrates the cheating behaviour of the two groups and shows that 
those who perform poorly do not only increase their probability to engage in any form of cheating 
(good players: Pearson Chi Square = 1.402, p = .118; bad players: Pearson Chi Square = 2.837, p = 
.046, both one-tailed) but also cheat more heavily by more severely exaggerating the number of 
mazes solved when under competition (good players: t = -.146, p = .443; bad players: t = - 1.534, p 
= 0.069, both one-tailed, for bad players t-test for unequal variances).
21 The latter is also illustrated 
                                                 
19 It has to be noted that in our experimental setting subjects have to realize that their poor performance becomes public 
with certainty (at least to the experimenter), while cheating may go undetected. 
20 Following this definition those players who solved >= 27 mazes were considered “good players”, those who solved < 
27 mazes were classified as “bad players”. The number of solved mazes includes those that have been solved with the 
help of cheating functions provided by the maze game (auto-solve, path-verify, change of level of difficulty). That way, 
out of the relatively small number of individuals who make use of at least one such cheating device, half are classified 
as “bad” and half as “good” players. Individuals who cheat typically use one (or more) of these functions for one or a 
few times in the middle of the game while solving other mazes correctly. Since we do not know how much mazes 
individuals would have been able to solve correctly during the time they have used one of the functions, the number of 
solved mazes remains our best proxy for ability. Because a few of our “good players” may actually only appear “good” 
due to their cheating activities, the size of the effect that (truly) good players cheat less may actually be underestimated. 
21 Potentially not all our “bad players” are of low ability, but merely put less effort in actually solving mazes as they 
substitute effort for cheating. While we cannot rule out this possibility, we think it is of a minor problem. First, as 
mentioned above, women have been found to perform less well in solving mazes also without a possibility to cheat in 
previous studies. As mainly women constitute the poor performers, this can at least partially be attributed to their lower 
general ability in solving mazes. Second, if there is a substitution of effort against cheating, women would constitute 
“irrational cheaters” as not only their number of actually solved mazes is lower than that of men but also the number of 
indicated mazes. If they would compensate low effort for cheating they were still doing insufficiently so.   11 
in Figure 3. For good players, on the other hand, no significant change in behaviour with respect to 
frequency and intensity of cheating is found between the two treatments.  
In Table 4 we now replicate the previous analysis but additionally control for the ability of a 
player and furthermore account for an interaction effect of ability and competition in column 4-6. 
As  it  turns  out,  once  we  include  the  latter,  the  interaction  effect  of  competition  and  male  sex 
becomes insignificant. Indeed, good players cheat significantly less under competitive pressure than 
bad players (-44 – 49 percentage points) and the correlation of the ability of players and sex is 
responsible for what has previously appeared as a sex effect of competition on cheating.  
  The probability that an individual is prepared to cheat is probably the most interesting but 
not the only available variable to investigate the effect of economic competition on cheating. We 
can also examine whether people cheat more heavily under competitive pressure. For example, 
under  competition they  may increase the number of levels on which they  cheat – as has been 
pointed out, subjects could lie about their results or use various illegitimate measures to facilitate 
the  task.  Furthermore,  individuals  could  lie  more  heavily  under  competitive  pressure.  We  will 
examine these questions in the following. 
  The  cheating  of  an  individual  in,  for  example,  two  different  ways  instead  of  one  way 
represents heavier cheating. However, it is unclear whether to judge this behaviour as double as 
severe as the cheating of a subject who merely uses one single cheating strategy. Consequently we 
estimated an ordered probit of the number of ways an individual cheated as presented in Table 5. 
We find that in the competitive treatment individuals significantly increase the ways they use for 
cheating. Again it turns out that this effect primarily holds for low ability players, as the effect of 
competition is muted for the good players. The interaction effect of good player and competition 
does not always reach significance though. Again people who enjoy the game cheat more – or 
rather the other way around. 
  Finally, in Table 6 we look at the intensity of cheating as represented by the difference of 
the number of mazes indicated versus actually solved by an individual. Since this difference has a 
natural cut-off point at zero, we conduct a Tobit estimation. Again, the effect of competition is 
positive, but less significant.
22  It appears that  good players may  generally  exaggerate less with 
respect to the number of mazes they indicate as solved – not only in the competitive treatment. 
Interestingly those subjects who like games of the kind used in the experiment lie less with respect 
to the amount of mazes they have solved while they do not appear to cheat less in general. This may 
mean that these individuals, who seem to represent ‘game afficiados’, happily cheat with the tools 
                                                 
22 Apart from column 5 and 6 where the effect is significant at the 5% level, only a significance level of 10% is reached.   12 
such a game supplies itself, while they may perceive it as dishonourable to blatantly lie about one’s 
result.  
   
Conclusion 
 
In this paper we investigated how increased competitive pressure affects individuals’ work behavior 
if there is a possibility to lie about one’s performance or to cheat in the acquisition of a certain work 
outcome. First of all, when there is an opportunity to cheat we do not find that individuals increase 
their effort under competition as commonly assumed and empirically found in some experiments 
(e.g. Gneezy et al., 2003; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004).
23 It seems that if individuals recognize a 
possibility to cheat, their incentives to increase effort under competition are muted. Second, while 
we do not find any significant sex difference in the overall amount of cheating in our experiment, 
women do significantly increase their cheating activity under competitive pressure while men do 
not significantly change their behavior. However, further investigation shows that it is not sex but 
ability that drives these results. In our sample women are doing significantly worse in the task at 
hand and are disproportionally clustered in the category of poor performers. Once we control for the 
fact that an individual is of high or low ability the sex-difference in cheating disappears. Instead it 
turns out that individuals who are less able to fulfill the assigned task do not only have a higher 
probability to cheat, they also cheat in more different ways. It appears that poor performers either 
feel entitled to cheat in a system that does not give them any legitimate opportunities to succeed, or 
they engage in a “face-saving” activity to avoid embarrassment for their poor performance.
24 This 
result  corresponds  with  earlier  findings  that  cheating  in  the  classroom  is  particularly  common 
among poor performers (Kerkvliet and Sigmund, 1999; Bunn et al., 1992). 
However, we caution to generalize that it is necessarily individuals with little chances to win 
who decide to cheat, but believe that this finding may depend on the specific setting. For example in 
sports also top performers have been found to be involved in doping scandals. In contrast to sport or 
many  other  real-life  tournaments,  in  our  experiment  the  ability  of  players  is  relatively 
heterogeneous.
25 As a result in our tournament top players do not face such strong competition from 
others – even if these cheat. In sports (or top management), however, the competition is primarily 
between individuals of much more identical ability. As a result, a little cheating may determine 
                                                 
23 Also Brandts et al. (2006) do not find an increase in efficiency as a result of heightened competition. 
24 Indeed, in our sample only one cheater actually wins a tournament as a result of her cheating behavior. 
25 It also has to be noted that in our experiment the stakes to cheat may be much lower as the “price” of winning can 
barely be compared with any real-life tournament price. 
   13 
whether one becomes the “winner” or not, while players of lower ability may have little chance to 
get to the top – no matter whether they cheat or not. Also with respect to scandals in academia, 
where for example research results have been feigned, or accounting frauds in management it can 
hardly be argued that the people involved are of “low ability.” It may be, however, that a temporary 
lack of luck or the feeling that in a competitive “dog eats dog” society one has to assist one’s luck, 
also drives individuals of higher ability into the temptation to cheat. 
 
 
   14 
References 
 
Antonovics, Kate; Peter Arcidiacono and Randall Walsh (2003): Competing Against the Opposite 
Sex, University of California at San Diego Working Paper. 
Günther,  Christina,  Arslan  Ekinci,  Neslihan,  Christiane  Schwieren  and  Martin  Strobel  (2008): 
Women Can’t Jump? An Experiment on Competitive Attitudes and Stereotype Threat. Mimeo.. 
Becker,  Gary  (1968):  Crime  and  Punishment:  An  Economic  Approach,  Journal  of  Political 
Economy, 76(2), 168-217. 
Becker, Gary S. (1957): The Economics of Discrimination, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Brandts, Jordi; Arno Riedl and Frans van Winden (2006): Competition and Well-Being, CEPR 
Working Paper. 
Bunn, Douglas N.; Steven B. Caudill and Daniel M. Gropper (1992): Crime in the Classroom: An 
Economic  Analysis  of  Undergraduate  Student  Cheating  Behavior,  Journal  of  Economic 
Education, 23(3), 197-207. 
Charness,  Gary;  Antonio  Cabrales  and  Marie-Claire  Villeval  (2006):  Competition,  Hidden 
Information and Efficiency: An Experiment, IZA Discussion Paper No. 2296 
Carpenter, Jeffrey; Peter Hans Matthews and John Schirm (2007): Tournaments and Office Politics: 
Evidence from a Real Effort Experiment, IZA Discussion Paper No. 2972. 
Datta  Gupta,  Nabanita;  Anders  Poulsen  and  Marie-Claire  Villeval  (2005):  Male  and  Female 
Competitive Behavior: Experimental Evindence, IZA Working Paper 1833. 
Enders, Walter and Gary A. Hoover (2004): Whose Line Is It? Plagiarism in Economics, Journal of 
Economic Literature, 42(2), 487-493. 
Frank, Robert H. and Philip J. Cook (1995): The Winner-Take-All Society, New York: Free Press. 
Franzoni, Luigi Alberto (2000): Tax Evasion and Tax Compliance, in: Bouckaert, Boudewijn and 
Gerrit  de  Geest  (eds.),  Encyclopedia  of  Law  and  Economics,  Vol.  4, Cheltenham:  Edward 
Elgar, 52-94. 
Gneezy,  Uri;  Muriel  Niederle  and  Aldo  Rustichini  (2003):  Performance  in  Competitive 
Environments: Gender Differences, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1049-74. 
Gneezy,  Uri  and  Aldo  Rustichini  (2004):  Gender  and  Competition  at  a  Young  Age,  American 
Economic Review, 94(2), 377-81. 
Harbring,  Christine  and  Bernd  Irlenbusch  (2003):  Sabotage  and  the  Endogenous  Design  of 
Tournaments, University of Bonn Working Paper.   15 
Harbring,  Christine  and  Bernd  Irlenbusch  (2008):  How  Many  Winners  are  Good  to  Have?  On 
Tournaments with Sabotage, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 65(3-4), 682-
702. 
Harbing,  Christine;  Bernd  Irlenbusch,  Matthias  Krackel  and  Reinhard  Selten  (forthcoming): 
Sabotage in Asymmetric Contests – An Experimental Analysis. International Journal of the 
Economics and Business. 
Hollingshead,  Andrea;  Gwen  M.  Wittenbaum;  Gwen  Costa  Jacobsohn  and  Samuel  N.  Fraidin 
(2005): The Impact of Competitive Members, Working Paper. 
Kerkvliet,  Joe  and  Charles  L.  Sigmund  (1999):  Can  We  Control  Cheating  in  the  Classroom? 
Research in Economic Education, 30(4), 331-343. 
Kohn, Alfie (1992): No Contest, Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
Kyklos (1999): A Case of Plagiarism, 52(3), 311-312. 
List,  John  A.;  Charles  D.  Bailey,  Patricia  J.  Euzent  and  Thomas  L.  Martin  (2001):  Academic 
Economists  Behaving  Badly?  A  Survey  on  Three  Areas  of  Unethical  Behavior,  Economic 
Inquiry, 39(1), 162-170. 
Nagin,  Daniel  S.;  James  B.  Rebitzer;  Seth  Sanders  and  Lowell  J.  Taylor  (2002):  Monitoring, 
Motivation,  and  Management:  The  Determinants  of  Opportunistic  Behavior  in  a  Field 
Experiment, American Economic Review, 92(4), 850-873. 
Niederle, Muriel and Lise Vesterlund (2007): Do Women Shy Away From Competition? Do Men 
Compete too Much? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(3), 1067-1101. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics (1984): Notice to Our Readers, 99(2), 383-384. 
Preston,  Ian  and  Stefan  Szymanski  (2003):  Cheating  in  Contests,  Oxford  Review  of  Economic 
Policy, 19(4), 612-624. 
Price, Joseph (2008): Gender Differences in the Response to Competition, Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, 61(3), 320-33. 
Research Policy (2007): Keeping Plagiarism at Bay – A Salutary Tale, 36(7), 905-911. 
Torgler, Benno and Nevent T. Valev (2006): Women and Illegal Activities: Gender Differences and 
Women’s  Willingness  to  Comply  over  Time,  Andrew  Young  School  of  Policy  Studies 
Research Paper. 
Vandegrift, Donald; Abdullah Yavas and Paul M. Brown (2004): Men, Women and Competition: 
An Experimental Test of Labor Market Behavior, Working Paper. 
Shleifer, Andrei (2004): Does Competition Destroy Ethical Behavior? American Economic 
 
   16 
Figures 
 





































1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46
solved mazes
Female
Male  17 
 
Figure 3 
Difference mazes (mazes indicated - solved) 




















  All (N = 32)  Women (N=17)  Men (N=15) 
Variable  Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
             
Mazes indicated  27.47  7.79  23.65  6.66  31.8  6.76 
Mazes solved  26.09  8.17  22.23  7.11  30.47  7.17 
 
Cheating 
           
Any form of cheating  0.375  0.491  0.294  0.47  0.467  0.516 
Difference mazes (= mazes 
indicated – solved)
 26 
1.31  2.79  1.35  3.48  1.27  1.83 
   Use of difference mazes (>1)  0.312      0.471  0.235     0.437    0.400    0.507 
   Use of Auto-Solve  0.062  0.246  0.059  0.242  0.067  0.258 
   Use of Path Verify  0.062  0.246  0.059  0.242  0.067  0.258 
   Change of level of difficulty  0.031  0.177  0  0  0.067  0.258 





  All (N = 33)  Women (N=15)  Men (N=18) 
Variable  Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
             
Mazes indicated  28.24  7.52  25.93  6.23  30.17  8.11 
Mazes solved  25.21  8.46  22.13  6.71  27.78  9.07 
             
Cheating             
Any form of cheating  0.424  0.502  0.600      0.517           0.278    0.461   
Difference mazes (mazes 
indicated – solved) 
2.91  5.41  3.8  5.97  2.17  4.95 
   Use of difference mazes (>1)  0.394      0.50    0.533     0.516  0.278   0.461 
   Use of Auto-Solve  0.121  0.331  0.200  0.414  0.055  0.236 
   Use of Path Verify  0.121  0.331  0.133  0.352  0.111  0.323 
   Change of level of difficulty  0  0  0  0  0  0 
             
 
 
                                                 
26 The difference between subtraction of the mean of “mazes solved” from the mean of “mazes indicated” with the 
“difference mazes” variable is due to the fact that the latter excludes cases where differences = 1 as described before.    19 
Table 2: Marginal probability of any kind of cheating 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  cheated in any 
way 
cheated in any 
way 
cheated in any 
way 
Competitive treatment  0.298  0.414  0.481 
  (0.164)  (0.175)*  (0.184)** 
Male  0.175  0.079  0.132 
  (0.171)  (0.218)  (0.227) 
Competitive treatment * male  -0.424  -0.391  -0.422 
  (0.162)**  (0.191)*  (0.181)* 
Studies (base: economics):       
   Humanities    0.296  0.264 
    (0.269)  (0.320) 
   Technology    0.439  0.446 
    (0.214)*  (0.235) 
   Law    -0.058  -0.139 
    (0.263)  (0.248) 
   Business    0.209  0.323 
    (0.178)  (0.196) 
   Other studies    0.245  0.367 
    (0.219)  (0.230) 
Age      0.027 
      (0.026) 
Enjoyed the play      0.229 
      (0.082)** 
Enjoys games in general      -0.158 
      (0.096) 
Observations  65  65  65 
Standard errors in parentheses                          
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
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Variable  Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
 
Cheating 
           
Any form of cheating  0.375  0.491  0.286  0.469  0.444  0.511 
Difference mazes (= mazes 
indicated – solved) 
1.37  2.78  1.86  3.90  0.89  1.45 









Variable  Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
             
Cheating             
Any form of cheating  0.424  0.502  0.588      0.507           0.25     0.447   
Difference mazes (mazes 
indicated – solved) 
3.03  5.35  4.88  6.90  0.81  1.60 
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Table 4: Marginal probability of any kind of cheating considering quality of player 
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 














0.298  0.412  0.477  0.422  0.606  0.691 
  (0.164)  (0.176)*  (0.185)**  (0.174)*  (0.175)**  (0.170)** 
Male  0.222  0.142  0.158  0.129  0.080  0.071 
  (0.178)  (0.225)  (0.234)  (0.193)  (0.230)  (0.240) 
Competition*male  -0.439  -0.406  -0.427  -0.347  -0.312  -0.315 
  (0.159)**  (0.187)*  (0.180)*  (0.198)  (0.228)  (0.230) 
Good player  -0.109  -0.152  -0.069  0.105  0.131  0.303 
  (0.133)  (0.142)  (0.160)  (0.196)  (0.205)  (0.228) 
Good player*comp        -0.344  -0.445  -0.493 
        (0.192)  (0.166)**  (0.152)** 
Studies:             
   Humanities    0.264  0.261    0.367  0.332 
    (0.277)  (0.320)    (0.266)  (0.319) 
   Technology    0.440  0.449    0.412  0.395 
    (0.218)*  (0.236)    (0.236)  (0.264) 
   Law    -0.115  -0.161    -0.223  -0.255 
    (0.254)  (0.243)    (0.212)  (0.190) 
   Business    0.238  0.328    0.278  0.380 
    (0.180)  (0.195)    (0.182)  (0.197) 
   Other studies    0.247  0.358    0.292  0.435 
    (0.222)  (0.233)    (0.231)  (0.239) 
Age      0.024      0.042 
      (0.027)      (0.029) 
Liked game      0.224      0.214 
      (0.082)**      (0.083)* 
Likes games      -0.150      -0.144 
      (0.098)      (0.100) 
Observations  65  65  65  65  65  65 
 
Standard errors in parentheses                 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 5: Ordered probability of number of ways an individual cheated (0-4) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 





















Competitive treat  0.777  0.772  1.016  1.217  1.096  1.545  1.921 
  (0.422)  (0.422)  (0.481)*  (0.527)*  (0.486)*  (0.578)**  (0.660)** 
Male  0.426  0.470  0.232  0.324  0.242  0.068  0.117 
  (0.428)  (0.452)  (0.551)  (0.574)  (0.479)  (0.560)  (0.583) 
Competition*male  -1.076  -1.095  -0.924  -1.029  -0.772  -0.587  -0.638 
  (0.595)  (0.599)  (0.666)  (0.693)  (0.642)  (0.698)  (0.727) 
Good player    -0.097  -0.229  -0.025  0.425  0.442  0.910 
    (0.322)  (0.345)  (0.387)  (0.494)  (0.516)  (0.621) 
Good player*comp          -0.925  -1.271  -1.597 
          (0.658)  (0.716)  (0.807)* 
Studies:               
   Humanities      0.429  0.476    0.639  0.621 
      (0.683)  (0.770)    (0.708)  (0.796) 
   Technology      1.020  1.051    0.912  0.880 
      (0.617)  (0.641)    (0.622)  (0.651) 
   Law      -0.474  -0.700    -0.773  -1.026 
      (0.727)  (0.785)    (0.752)  (0.819) 
   Business      0.507  0.669    0.612  0.819 
      (0.430)  (0.459)    (0.438)  (0.474) 
   Other studies      0.375  0.660    0.416  0.760 
      (0.506)  (0.548)    (0.518)  (0.569) 
Age        0.059      0.102 
        (0.064)      (0.069) 
Liked play        0.578      0.563 
        (0.198)**      (0.201)** 
Likes games        -0.373      -0.358 
        (0.237)      (0.241) 
Observations  65  65  65  65  65  65  65 
Standard errors in parentheses                 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%               
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Table 6: Tobit analysis of difference mazes solved and mazes indicated 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 














Competitive treat.  6.853  6.582  6.987  6.448  8.059  8.892  8.624 
  (3.910)  (3.684)  (3.824)  (3.809)  (4.007)*  (4.317)*  (4.324) 
Male  2.254  4.856  -0.927  -2.381  3.229  -1.555  -3.281 
  (4.000)  (4.052)  (4.769)  (4.974)  (4.253)  (4.661)  (4.880) 
Competition*male  -7.139  -8.157  -3.090  -1.395  -5.997  -1.695  0.405 
  (5.513)  (5.275)  (5.523)  (5.548)  (5.582)  (5.555)  (5.602) 
Good player    -5.604  -7.734  -5.632  -2.446  -4.589  -1.706 
    (2.821)  (2.860)**  (2.886)  (4.255)  (4.139)  (4.382) 
Good player*comp          -5.335  -5.522  -6.500 
          (5.602)  (5.571)  (5.724) 
Studies:               
   Humanities      -1.447  -7.698    -0.277  -7.124 
      (6.050)  (7.790)    (6.045)  (7.735) 
   Technology      12.268  11.466    11.339  10.212 
      (5.183)*  (4.978)*    (5.129)*  (4.982)* 
   Law      -3.928  -4.067    -5.094  -5.401 
      (5.545)  (5.378)    (5.615)  (5.471) 
   Business      5.775  6.155    6.062  6.384 
      (3.491)  (3.406)    (3.492)  (3.400) 
   Other studies      0.812  1.318    1.069  1.628 
      (4.116)  (4.051)    (4.098)  (4.022) 
Age        0.812      0.957 
        (0.542)      (0.554) 
Liked play        2.982      2.732 
        (1.481)*      (1.465) 
Likes games        -3.720      -3.402 
        (1.847)*      (1.826) 
Constant  -6.327  -4.094  -4.516  -19.710  -4.893  -5.750  -24.312 
  (3.206)  (3.058)  (3.944)  (11.906)  (3.210)  (4.208)  (12.760) 
Observations  65  65  65  65  65  65  65 
Standard errors in parentheses                 








Thank you for participating in this experiment and for contributing to a research project of the 
Economics Department. The money you earn in the experiment will be paid privately at the end of 
the experiment. From now until the end of the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with 
the other participants. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of the 
experimenters will answer your questions privately. Pease, do not ask aloud! 
 
 
In this experiment we ask you to solve mazes. In the first part you have the possibility to solve 





In this first part you are asked to solve one or two mazes in difficulty level 2 to get familiar with the 




You are only allowed to use the arrows to move the marker through the maze. Each game is only 
finished and solved when the marker reaches the end of the maze together with the sign with the 
phrase “Yahoo! You have successfully solved the puzzle”. You need to use the mouse to click 
“OK” and “New maze”. 
 
If you have questions, please ask the experimenter privately. 
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Second part: [competitive treatment] 
 
In this part of the experiment you are part of a group of 6 randomly selected subjects (including 
you). We ask you to solve mazes for exactly 30 minutes.  
 
Please wait until the experimenter tells you to load a new maze to start.  
 
Payment: 
In each group of 6 subjects, only the participant who solved the largest number of mazes is paid € 
1,80 for each maze he or she solved. In case of a tie, the winners share the payment equally. In 
addition you will receive € 3,- for having participated in the experiment. The other participants 
receive no pay in addition to the € 3,- show-up fee.  
 
Computer use: 
You are only allowed to use the arrows to move the marker through the maze. Each game is only 
finished and solved when the marker reaches the end of the maze together with the sign with the 
phrase “Yahoo! You have successfully solved the puzzle”. You need to use the mouse to click 
“OK” and “New maze”. Then you can start the new maze using the arrows. Do not use any other 
function available.  
 
After finishing a maze, record the current time in the following table to document the numbers of 
mazes you have solved. Only this way we can know how many mazes you solved for paying you. 
The experiment closes after this part of the experiment (30 minutes). You will be paid in cash 
directly afterwards. 
 
If you have questions, please ask the experimenter privately. 
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Second part: [piece rate condition] 
 
In this part of the experiment we ask you to solve mazes for exactly 30 minutes.  
 
Please wait until the experimenter tells you to load a new maze to start.  
 
Payment: 
The amount of money you get paid at the end of the experiment depends of the number of mazes 
that you solve. For each maze that you solve, you will receive 30 cents. In addition you will receive 
€ 3,- for having participated in the experiment. You will be paid directly after finishing the 
experiment in cash. 
 
Computer use: 
You are only allowed to use the arrows to move the marker through the maze. Each game is only 
finished and solved when the marker reaches the end of the maze together with the sign with the 
phrase “Yahoo! You have successfully solved the puzzle”. You need to use the mouse to click 
“OK” and “New maze”. Then you can start the new maze using the arrows. Do not use any other 
function available.  
 
After finishing a maze, record the current time in the following table to document the numbers of 
mazes you have solved. Only this way we can know how many mazes you solved for paying you. 
The experiment closes after this part of the experiment (30 minutes). You will be paid in cash 
directly afterwards. 
 
If you have questions, please ask the experimenter privately.   27 
 
Maze  Time finished (hour:minutes) e.g. 12:13 
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How much did you enjoy solving mazes?  
 
Very much  1   2   3  4  5  not at all 
 
 
How good do you think you are in solving mazes, compared to other students? 
 
□  Better 
□  Equal 
□  Worse 
 
 
[In the competitive treatment:]  
 
How much do you like competitive games like this? 
 
Very much  1  2  3  4  5  not at all 
 
 
What is your age? ________ 
 
What is your sex?      M       F  
 
What do you study? ________ 
 
 